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Effect of Aging on Housing Prices: A Perspective from an 
Overlapping Generation Model 
Tianyu Sun*, Satish Chand and Keiran Sharpe 
ABSTRACT 
This paper investigates the effect of aging on housing prices. It provides a theoretical 
explanation to address the on-going debate about the impact of aging on house prices. The 
analysis demonstrates that aging has divergent effects on housing prices, depending on the net 
effects of a fall in fertility vis-à-vis a rise in longevity on demand for housing. In addition, the 
results suggest that aging can produce a turning point in the price dynamics. To the left of the 
peak, aging boosts prices while to the right, it has the opposite effect. Furthermore, inequality 
of household utility is enlarged during the aging processes.  
JEL classification: E21, E31, J11, R21, R31 
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1. Introduction 
Will an aging population affect housing prices? The extant literature provides divergent 
answers to this question. The first argues that an aging population will have a significant effect 
on housing prices (Mankiw and Weil 1989, 1991, Bergantino 1998, Takáts 2012), and the 
second opined that aging would have little or mixed impact (Engelhardt and Poterba 1991, 
Hendershott 1991, Poterba 2001, Eichholtz and Lindenthal 2014, Hiller and Lerbs 2016). The 
debate on the impact of aging on housing prices is largely drawn from empirical studies, and 
remains alive (Poterba 2014). This paper contributes to the extant literature by investigating 
the effects of aging within the context of an overlapping generations model (OLG) to explain 
the mixed results from empirical studies estimating the effects of aging on housing prices.   
The results show that an aging population can result from a fall in fertility and/or an increase 
in longevity: housing prices increase only when the net effect of the above is positive.  More 
specifically, a fertility rate lower than the replacement level will depress housing prices while 
an increase in longevity has the opposite effect. The above explains some of the divergent 
effects of an aging population on housing prices in different contexts. From this perspective, 
the seemingly contradictory views from previous empirical research can be reconciled. 
Moreover, an increase in longevity with a synchronized fall in fertility can lead to an increase 
in prices initially with the effect being overturned later, leading to a turning point in price 
dynamics over time. Specifically, an aging population resulting from an increase in longevity 
with a decline in fertility can initially boost demand for housing and lead to the increase in 
prices, but this effect will peter out as the working-age population begins to shrink. This finding 
casts fresh light on the relationship between demographic changes and economic fluctuations. 
The results presented above have been obtained using an OLG model that has been drawn 
from two separate strands in the literature. The first strand is drawn from Iacoviello and Neri 
(2010), in whose work the housing market is analysed using a Dynamic Stochastic General 
Equilibrium (DSGE) model. The settings of our model are mainly based on their approach, but 
are transformed to an OLG framework to incorporate the age structure of the population. The 
second strand of our model comes from the research into land prices (Davis and Heathcote 
2007, Liu, Wang, and Zha 2013). Their insights are to separate out the effects of land and 
construction on the price of a house.  
3 
 
Our paper fits into the emerging literature on housing prices using theoretical models.1 While 
this literature has focused on various factors underscoring the demand for housing, it has not 
addressed the impact of aging that we focus on here.  In addition, our paper also contributes to 
the literature on the consequences of aging on the accumulation of assets and savings.2 The 
bulk of theoretical work in this area has ignored housing as an asset, a major deficiency given 
that housing is the largest component of households’ wealth. We address this void in the 
literature. 
We first model the long-term effect of an aging population on housing prices, and then 
simulate the dynamics of housing prices due to demographic changes. Although our work aims 
to reach general conclusions about the effects of aging, the results are based on simulations that 
in turn are sensitive to the parameters of the model. Our parameters are calibrated for China 
for two compelling reasons: (i) housing assets constitute more than 70 percent of Chinese 
households’ wealth (Xie and Jin 2015); and, (ii) China is undergoing rapid aging of its 
population (Lutz, Sanderson, and Scherbov 2008). Thus, choosing the parameters for China 
provides us with a typical example without losing the generality of the conclusions. 
Our results show that demographic change has a bigger impact on land prices than that for 
construction, a fact revealed only when the two are looked at separately. This result is 
consistent with the empirical findings of Davis and Heathcote (2007). Specifically, our 
simulations show that a decline in the fertility rate of 10 percent from the replacement level for 
one generation (i.e. 30 years in our model) leads to a fall in the price of construction by 1 
percent whereas the price of land falls by 10 percent. In contrast, when longevity increases by 
6 percent then the corresponding house and land prices increase by 1 percent and 7 percent, 
respectively.  
We next investigate the effects of a simultaneous change in fertility and longevity on 
households’ utility. Anticipating the results, workers would have greater utility because of 
higher house and land ownership per capita; however, the utility of the retirees is worse. 
Assuming perfect foresight in the model, the consequential housing prices would increase 
immediately before the demographic changes and decline as the effects of the fall in fertility 
take over.  
                                                 
1
 See, for example, Iacoviello (2005); Iacoviello and Neri (2010); Liu, Wang, and Zha (2013); Justiniano, Primiceri, and Tambalotti (2015); 
Ng (2015); Chen and Wen (2017). 
2
 See, for example, Ando and Modigliani (1963); Brooks (2000); Brooks (2002); Abel (2001); Abel (2003); Modigliani and Cao (2004); 
and Curtis, Lugauer, and Mark (2015). 
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The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the OLG model, 
Section 3 presents the assumptions and the calibration of parameters, while section 4 shows 
the solution method. Section 5 presents the long-term effects of aging on housing prices, and 
section 6 investigates household utility and the housing price dynamics. Section 7 concludes. 
2. The Model 
2.1. Demography 
The model’s time structure is the same as the classical model of Diamond (1965). The 
economy consists of two overlapping generations, namely, workers and retirees, who are alive 
in both periods. For each generation, we assume that the households are identical.3  
The population of workers is affected only by the rate of fertility. The fertility rate at time t, 
denoted by 𝑛𝑡 , is given as equation (1), where 𝑁𝑡,1  and 𝑁𝑡−1,1  represent the population of 
workers at time t and its previous period, respectively. Note that in this stylized model, the 
fertility rate is equal to the rate of growth of workers.  
𝑛𝑡 =
𝑁𝑡,1
𝑁𝑡−1,1
(1) 
The population of retirees, in contrast, is influenced by both the fertility rate and longevity. 
Following Blackburn and Cipriani (2002) and Cipriani (2013), longevity is defined by the share 
of households that survive to retirement stage. Specifically, households are alive as workers 
with certainty, but a fraction die at the beginning of their retirement, while the rest live for the 
remaining period of retirement. This survival function is given as equation (2), where 𝑁𝑡−1,1 
and 𝑁𝑡,2  represent the number of workers in period 𝑡 − 1  and the retirees in period t 
respectively.  
𝜋𝑡 =
𝑁𝑡,2
𝑁𝑡−1,1
(2) 
Based on (1) and (2), the population dynamics of retirees is given as: 
𝑁𝑡,2
𝑁𝑡−1,2
=
𝑛𝑡−1𝜋𝑡
𝜋𝑡−1
(3) 
                                                 
3
 Therefore, if we know the population of each generation, then the aggregate and per-capita values can be transformed from one to the 
each other. For the purposes of illustration, we will present the model mainly using aggregate variables (except the section about households). 
The equations for individuals are listed in Appendix A. 
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2.2. Households 
Utility 
 The households’ utility is characterized by (4) as follows:  
𝑈𝑡 = 𝑈( 𝑈𝑡,1, 𝑈𝑡+1,2) = 𝑈𝑡,1 + 𝜋𝑡+1 𝛽 𝐸(𝑈𝑡+1,2) (4) 
Following Diamond (1965), the expected life span utility of a household ( 𝑈𝑡 ) is time 
separable and is determined by the sum of utility when working, 𝑈𝑡,1 and that when retired, 
𝑈𝑡+1,2. Two discount factors are 1) the time preference 𝛽 (0 < 𝛽 < 1) and 2) the survival rate 
𝜋. The form of equation (4) is consistent with the practice that survival rates are involved.4 
The utility during work (𝑈𝑡,1) is given as: 
𝑈𝑡,1 = ln(𝑐𝑡,1) + 𝑗ℎ ln(ℎ𝑡,1) + 𝑗𝑙 ln(𝑙𝑡,1) −
𝜏
1 + 𝜂
(𝑛𝑐,𝑡
1+𝜉
+ 𝑛ℎ,𝑡
1+𝜉
)
1+𝜂
1+𝜉 (5) 
Following Iacoviello and Neri (2010) and Liu, Wang, and Zha (2013), the terms providing 
positive utility in (5) are per capita consumption of goods, 𝑐𝑡,1, structure of houses, ℎ𝑡,1, and 
land, 𝑙𝑡,1. Variables 𝑛𝑐,𝑡 and 𝑛ℎ,𝑡 represent hours worked in non-housing and housing sectors 
respectively.  The negative term on the far right of (5) represents the disutility of work. 
First, we explain why both the building and land are in the utility function. Housing provides 
utility and consists of the construction and land. However, the literature includes either the 
structure or the land in the utility function. We include both, and each contributes to utility 
separately. We assume that land provides utility above and beyond the building that sits on it.  
For example, the houses that occupy bigger land (e.g. villas) provide additional utility 
compared to apartments of identical residential space. This may be rationalised as green space 
providing utility of its own. This preference is supported by scholarship within psychology.5  
Back to the equation (5), the parameters 𝑗ℎ and 𝑗𝑙 represent the preference for house and land 
respectively, and the parameter 𝜏 denotes the disutility of work. The parameter 𝜂 > 0 ensures 
that the utility function is concave with respect to labour supply. In addition, the parameter 𝜉 >
0 indicates the labour mobility between the two production sectors is imperfect (Horvath 2000, 
Iacoviello and Neri 2010).  
The utility function for the retirees, who do not participate in the labour market, is analogous 
to (5); that is,  
𝑈𝑡+1,2 = ln(𝑐𝑡+1,2) + 𝑗ℎ ln(ℎ𝑡+1,2) + 𝑗𝑙 ln(𝑙𝑡+1,2) (6) 
                                                 
4
 See, for example, Blackburn and Cipriani (2002), Cipriani (2013) and Muto, Oda, and Sudo (2016) 
5
 See, for example, Griffit and Veitch (1971) and Sundstrom (1975). 
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, where the consumption, house and land per capita of this generation are denoted by 𝑐𝑡+1,2, 
ℎ𝑡+1,2 and 𝑙𝑡+1,2 respectively.  
Budget Constraint 
The budget constraint for individual worker is as follows: 
𝑐𝑡,1 + 𝑞𝑡ℎ𝑡,1 + 𝑝𝑙,𝑡𝑙𝑡,1 = (1 − 𝑇)(𝑤𝑐,𝑡𝑛𝑐,𝑡 + 𝑤ℎ,𝑡𝑛ℎ,𝑡 + 𝑑𝑡) (7) 
, where the right side is the income of the workers and the left side is the expenditures. The 
income can be divided into wage, 𝑤𝑐,𝑡𝑛𝑐,𝑡 + 𝑤ℎ,𝑡𝑛ℎ,𝑡, and dividend, 𝑑𝑡, income. Workers pay 
tax of T, and thus the fraction (1 − 𝑇) is the share of the income kept by the workers while the 
remainder accrues to the retirees. One could rationalize the specification of ‘T’ in (7) as a pay-
as-you-go pension system where the current generation of workers are taxed to fund 
consumption of the retirees. 
The expenditure is 𝑐𝑡,1 + 𝑞𝑡ℎ𝑡,1 + 𝑝𝑙,𝑡𝑙𝑡,1, where 𝑞𝑡  and 𝑝𝑙,𝑡  denote the prices of structure 
and land respectively. The households do not have deposits because it equals the loans to the 
firms. However, the firms are assumed to be owned by all the households collectively. Thus, 
for any individual, one cannot retrieve the capital of firms for consumption. Instead, households 
have the right to claim for the profits of the firms, i.e. the dividend 𝑑𝑡 in equation (7). Further 
illustration can be found in the section of firms.  
The budget constraint for individual retiree is as follows: 
𝑐1+𝑡,2 + 𝑞1+𝑡ℎ1+𝑡,2 + 𝑝𝑙,1+𝑡𝑙1+𝑡,2 =
𝑇(𝑑1+𝑡 + 𝑛𝑐,1+𝑡𝑤𝑐,1+𝑡 + 𝑛ℎ,1+𝑡𝑤ℎ,1+𝑡)
𝑛1+𝑡
𝜋1+𝑡
+ (8)
𝑞1+𝑡(1 − 𝛿ℎ) (
ℎ𝑡,1
𝜋1+𝑡
+
𝜋𝑡ℎ𝑡,2
𝜋1+𝑡𝑛𝑡
) + 𝑝𝑙,1+𝑡 (
𝑙ℎ,𝑡,1
𝜋1+𝑡
+
𝜋𝑡𝑙𝑡,2
𝜋1+𝑡𝑛𝑡
)
 
The right part of (8) is the income of retirees, while the left part is expenditures. The revenues 
accruing to the retirees have some differences with that of workers because the revenues consist 
of three parts: 1) the pension payments; 2) the wealth accumulated previously; and 3) 
inheritances. The aggregate values of these revenues are listed in Table 1, and the per capita 
values can be derived according to the equations (1), (2) and (3) by dividing the totals by the 
population of retirees, 𝑁1+𝑡,2. 
For the pension system, the retirees receive a share of the wage and profit revenues of all the 
households as explained above. They also have income from accumulated wealth in the form 
of houses and lands that they purchased while working. Moreover, inheritance being equal to 
the left-over wealth of the previous generation is an additional component of income of retirees.  
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Table 1—Aggregate market values of retirees’ income 
Pensions 𝑻(𝒅𝟏+𝒕𝑵𝟏+𝒕,𝟏 + 𝒏𝒄,𝟏+𝒕𝒘𝒄,𝟏+𝒕𝑵𝟏+𝒕,𝟏 + 𝒏𝒉,𝟏+𝒕𝒘𝒉,𝟏+𝒕𝑵𝟏+𝒕,𝟏) 
Wealth 𝜋𝑡+1(𝑞𝑡+1(1 − 𝛿ℎ)ℎ𝑡,1𝑁𝑡,1 + 𝑝𝑙,𝑡+1𝑙𝑡,1𝑁𝑡,1) 
Inheritances 
𝑞𝑡+1(1 − 𝛿ℎ)ℎ𝑡,2𝑁𝑡,2 + 𝑝𝑙,𝑡+1𝑙𝑡,2𝑁𝑡,2 + 
(1 − 𝜋𝑡+1)𝑞𝑡+1(1 − 𝛿ℎ)ℎ𝑡,1𝑁𝑡,1 + (1 − 𝜋𝑡+1)𝑝𝑙,𝑡+1𝑙𝑡,1𝑁𝑡,1 
Note: 𝛿ℎ represents depreciation rate of houses. 
In particular, the inheritance is in the form of houses (and land) and assumed to be so for 
three reasons. First, housing is needed by every individual, including the retired. Second, 
houses cannot be fully consumed by their owners, even at the time of their death. Third, houses 
are bequeathed to the next generation. For example, during the study of the bequest decision 
of Australians, Ding (2012) stated that housing assets constitute the bulk of bequests.  
In our model, inheritance comes from two sources: 1) the previous generation of retirees, 
whose population is 𝑁𝑡,2 ; and 2) the workers who do not survive to retirement, whose 
population is (1 − 𝜋𝑡+1)𝑁𝑡,1. The market values of these two parts are 𝑞𝑡+1(1 − 𝛿ℎ)ℎ𝑡,2𝑁𝑡,2 +
𝑝𝑙,𝑡+1𝑙𝑡,2𝑁𝑡,2  and (1 − 𝜋𝑡+1)𝑞𝑡+1(1 − 𝛿ℎ)ℎ𝑡,1𝑁𝑡,1 + (1 − 𝜋𝑡+1)𝑝𝑙,𝑡+1𝑙𝑡,1𝑁𝑡,1  respectively, 
where 𝛿ℎ represents that rate of depreciation of houses. Meanwhile, the market value of house 
and land purchased during their working period is 𝜋𝑡+1(𝑞𝑡+1(1 − 𝛿ℎ)ℎ𝑡,1𝑁𝑡,1 + 𝑝𝑙,𝑡+1𝑙𝑡,1𝑁𝑡,1). 
Thus, the total market value of the housing wealth is obtained by adding these parts together 
and is represented as 𝑞𝑡+1(1 − 𝛿ℎ)ℎ𝑡,1𝑁𝑡,1 + 𝑝𝑙,𝑡+1𝑙𝑡,1𝑁𝑡,1. 
2.3. Firms 
The other agent in the economy is the firms. We adapt the model in Liu, Wang, and Zha 
(2013) where firms are assumed to exist forever, and they have three important functions. The 
first is that they produce goods for consumption and housing, and this function will be 
illustrated in the section on technology. Furthermore, the firms invest in and maintain plant and 
equipment. Finally, firms maximize profits with the proceeds paid to households in the form 
of dividends. 
Profit maximization 
 Following Liu, Wang, and Zha (2013), firms maximize long-run profits, denoted as follows: 
𝑀𝑎𝑥 ∑ 𝛽𝑒
𝑡 ln(𝐷𝑡)
𝑡
(9) 
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, where 𝐷𝑡 = 𝑑𝑡𝑁𝑡,1  represents the total profits of the firms in period t. In addition, the 
parameter 𝛽𝑒 represents the time preference of firms. Additionally, the time preference of firms 
is less than that of the households, i.e. 𝛽𝑒 < 𝛽, lending the incentive to invest (Iacoviello 2005, 
Liu, Wang, and Zha 2013, Iacoviello 2015). By using the log-function in (9), we assume that 
the firm prefers stable profit flow. This assumption follows from risk-aversion by households 
who own these firms (Sandmo 1971, Leland 1972, Oh, Rhodes, and Strong 2016).  
A major modification from Liu, Wang, and Zha (2013) is that, in our model, the firms are 
assumed to be owned by all the households instead of a certain fraction of them. This 
modification allows us to focus on the households’ heterogeneity of age structures without the 
complication of income distribution. Without this modification, as shown in Liu, Wang, and 
Zha (2013), the entrepreneurs would be introduced as a distinct class from the employees.  
Here, we further provide microeconomic explanations about the assumed ownership of the 
firms above. To begin with, the economy consists of many firms. When viewing the firms 
together, it works as the firms in our model. In addition, every firm is owned by some 
households, while every household is one of the owners of some firms because we have no 
distinction between entrepreneurs and employees. Lastly, the households have full insurance 
on their wage and profits, thus their income is subject to the performance of the aggregate 
economy. 
One of the consequences of the setting above is that households do not have deposits. 
Because the deposit is held as capital of firms, the households as owners of firms do not need 
separate deposit accounts. According to (16), the capital can be adjusted and distributed to 
households in the form of profit. From this point of view, the personal deposits are not 
disappeared but pooled in the total capitals. A possible drawback is that this saving is the same 
for all the households; nevertheless, modelling wealth distribution aside from the housing asset 
is beyond the scope of this paper.  
Furthermore, we will explain why we have 𝛽𝑒 < 𝛽 based on the setting above. Although 
each firm is owned by a panel of households, the time that the panel can own this firm will be 
no more than the longevity of households (because only living people can be on the panel). 
Thus, the firm owners, although they are households, will be more impatient about the future 
of firms than their own lives. This explanation is consistent with the reality that the survival 
rates of firms are less than that of the households.  
Technologies 
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 An often cited omission from previous research on the effect of aging population on housing 
prices is the supply side of the market (Swan 1995). We follow Iacoviello and Neri (2010) and 
treat the supply of housing as a separable production sector from the non-housing productions.  
Non-housing production sector: The non-housing sector uses Cobb-Douglas technology of 
the form: 
𝑌𝑡 = 𝐴𝑐,𝑡𝐾𝑐,𝑡−1
𝜇𝑐 𝑁𝑐,𝑡
1−𝜇𝑐 (10) 
The non-housing production is denoted by 𝑌𝑡 = 𝑦𝑡𝑁𝑡,1, and there are three types of variables 
involved in the production process:  the aggregate capital of non-housing production sector, 
𝐾𝑐,𝑡−1 = 𝑘𝑐,𝑡−1𝑁𝑡−1,1; the labour employed, 𝑁𝑐,𝑡 = 𝑛𝑐,𝑡𝑁𝑡,1; and the Total Factor Productivity 
(TFP) in the non-housing production sector, 𝐴𝑐,𝑡.  
Housing production sector: Similar to that of the non-housing production sector, housing 
production takes the form: 
IH𝑡 = 𝐴ℎ,𝑡𝐾ℎ,𝑡−1
𝜇ℎ 𝐿𝑒,𝑡−1
𝜇𝑙 𝑁ℎ,𝑡
1−𝜇ℎ−𝜇𝑙 (11) 
The houses built by the housing production sector is denoted by IH𝑡 = 𝑖ℎ𝑡𝑁𝑡,1 . The 
construction of houses needs capital 𝐾ℎ,𝑡−1 = 𝑘ℎ,𝑡−1𝑁𝑡−1,1, land (which is owned by the firms) 
𝐿𝑒,𝑡−1 = 𝑙𝑒,𝑡−1𝑁𝑡−1,1 , and labour 𝑁ℎ,𝑡 = 𝑛ℎ,𝑡𝑁𝑡,1  while TFP growth is denoted by 𝐴ℎ,𝑡 .  
Following the work of Iacoviello and Neri (2010), we assume the land is indispensable for the 
production of housing.  
Capital Accumulation 
We denote the investments in non-housing and housing sectors in period t as IK𝑐,𝑡 = 𝑖𝑘𝑐,𝑡𝑁𝑡,1 
and IKℎ,𝑡 = 𝑖𝑘ℎ,𝑡𝑁𝑡,1  respectively. Following Liu, Wang, and Zha (2013), the capital 
accumulation processes for the non-housing and housing sectors are assumed to have the 
following specifications: 
𝐾𝑐,𝑡 = (1 − 𝛿kc)𝐾𝑐,𝑡−1 + IK𝑐,𝑡 − Φ𝑐,𝑡 (12) 
𝐾ℎ,𝑡 = (1 − 𝛿kh)𝐾ℎ,𝑡−1 + IKℎ,𝑡 − Φℎ,𝑡 (13) 
, where parameters 𝛿kc and 𝛿kh represent the depreciation rates of capital in the non-housing 
and housing sectors respectively.  
In addition, when facing external shocks, the capital accumulations may accrue losses 
because of adjustment cost. The adjustment cost of capital includes opportunity costs of 
underutilized capital, the costs of obsolescence, and transition costs among activities (de 
Córdoba et al. 2006). The adjustment cost can exist in a long period as 30 years in our model 
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because it is the sum of the cost that happens within this period. We use Φ𝑐,𝑡 and Φℎ,𝑡 to denote 
the accumulated adjustment cost of non-housing and housing sectors in period t. Following 
Iacoviello and Neri (2010) and Liu, Wang, and Zha (2013), they have the following 
specifications: 
Φ𝑐,𝑡 = Φ𝑐(𝐾𝑐,𝑡, 𝐾𝑐,𝑡−1) =
𝜙𝑘𝑐
2
(
𝐾𝑐,𝑡
𝐾𝑐,𝑡−1
− exp (𝑔𝐾𝐶,𝑡))
2
𝐾𝑐,𝑡−1 (14) 
Φℎ,𝑡 = Φℎ(𝐾ℎ,𝑡, 𝐾ℎ,𝑡−1) =
𝜙𝑘ℎ
2
(
𝐾ℎ,𝑡
𝐾ℎ,𝑡−1
− exp (𝑔𝐾𝐻,𝑡))
2
𝐾ℎ,𝑡−1 (15) 
, where 𝜙𝑘𝑐 and 𝜙𝑘ℎ are the parameters that represent the specific frictions in adjusting the 
capital stocks in non-housing and housing sectors respectively. In addition, variables 𝑔𝐾𝐶,𝑡 and 
𝑔𝐾𝐻,𝑡 denote the trend capital growth rates on which the corresponding adjustment cost would 
be zero. The trend growth rate will be illustrated in the section of solution method. 
Budget Constraint 
 The aggregate budget constraint of the firms is as follows: 
𝐷𝑡 +
𝐾𝑐,𝑡
𝐴𝑘,𝑡
+ 𝐾ℎ,𝑡 + 𝑤𝑐,𝑡𝑁𝑐,𝑡 + 𝑤ℎ,𝑡𝑁ℎ,𝑡 + 𝑝𝑙,𝑡𝐿𝑒,𝑡 +
Φ𝑐,𝑡
𝐴𝑘,𝑡
+ Φℎ,𝑡
= 𝑌𝑡 + 𝑞𝑡 IH𝑡 +
1−𝛿kc
𝐴𝑘,𝑡
𝐾𝑐,𝑡−1 + (1 − 𝛿kh)𝐾ℎ,𝑡−1 + 𝑝𝑙,𝑡𝐿𝑒,𝑡−1 (16)
 
The right side of the (16) is the resources available to the firms while the left side is the 
payments for the above. Firms have revenues from: 1) selling non-housing and housing 
productions; 2) the balance of capital after depreciation, and 3) the market value of land owned 
by the firm. For the capital in the non-housing sector, as in Iacoviello and Neri (2010), the 
investment specific technology shock is introduced to the model and denoted by 𝐴𝑘,𝑡.  
The distribution of this wealth can be divided into four parts. Firstly, firms pay profits to 
households, as denoted by 𝐷𝑡 in (16). Secondly, the capital stocks for next period are decided 
by the firms, which are denoted as 𝐾𝑐,𝑡 and 𝐾ℎ,𝑡. Along with this process, the capital adjustment 
costs are involved (Φ𝑐,𝑡 and Φℎ,𝑡). Thirdly, wages are paid to the workers. Lastly, the firms 
will decide on the amount of land owned in this period.  
2.4. Equilibrium 
There are four markets in our model, which are 1) the non-housing production market, 2) the 
housing market, 3) the land market, and 4) the labour market. These markets are assumed to be 
perfectly competitive, meaning that the prices have no mark-up and the payments of production 
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factors are equal to their marginal contributions. The equilibrium conditions of the first three 
markets are: 
𝑌𝑡 = 𝐶𝑡 +
IK𝑐,𝑡
𝐴𝑘,𝑡
+ IKℎ,𝑡 + Φ𝑡 (17) 
𝐻𝑡 = IH𝑡 + (1 − 𝛿ℎ)𝐻𝑡−1 (18) 
𝐿𝑡 = 𝐿ℎ,𝑡 + 𝐿𝑒,𝑡 (19) 
, where 𝐶𝑡 = 𝑐𝑡,1𝑁𝑡,1 + 𝑐𝑡,2𝑁𝑡,2 , 𝐻𝑡 = ℎ𝑡,1𝑁𝑡,1 + ℎ𝑡,2𝑁𝑡,2 , 𝐿ℎ,𝑡 = 𝑙ℎ,𝑡,1𝑁𝑡,1 + 𝑙ℎ,𝑡,2𝑁𝑡,2 , 𝑌𝑡 =
𝑦𝑡𝑁𝑡,1, 𝐻𝑡 = ℎ𝑡𝑁𝑡,1, 𝐿𝑡 = 𝑙𝑡𝑁𝑡,1. 
For the labour market, its equilibrium means the labour supply of households would be equal 
to the labour demand of firms. This equilibrium amount of working hours has been denoted by 
𝑁𝑐,𝑡 and 𝑁ℎ,𝑡 in the previous discussion (or per worker, 𝑛𝑐,𝑡 and 𝑛ℎ,𝑡). 
3. Assumptions and Calibration 
3.1. Demographic Assumptions 
In this research, we study both the effects of a decline in the fertility rate and an increase in 
longevity on housing prices. The levels of the decline and increase are arbitrarily chosen; 
however, the analysis on them will be sufficient to show the general housing price dynamics 
before, during and after the aging population process.  
Specifically, at the period 1 and 2, the fertility rate is set at the replacement level. Using 
variable 𝛾𝑁,𝑡 to represent the rate of growth of the worker population, then 𝛾𝑁,1 = 𝛾𝑁,2 = 0. 
The first shock is a fall in the fertility rate of 10 percent in period 3 (Figure 1a), and this fall is 
foreseen by the agents of the economy beforehand. Correspondingly, we have 𝛾𝑁,3 = −0.1. In 
period 4, the fertility rate is returned to the replacement level as its original state and kept stable 
from then on (Figure 1a). For worker population, it means that 𝛾𝑁,𝑡 = 0, 𝑡 ≥ 4. 
The second shock is an increase in the survival rates 𝜋𝑡 . Correspondingly, the longevity 
increases. In period 1 and 2, we assume that 𝜋1 = 𝜋2 = 0.8. In period 3, the survival rate 
increases to 0.9 and remains constant thereafter, i.e. 𝜋𝑡 = 0.9, 𝑡 ≥ 3. Again, the longevity 
changes are known by the agents of the economy beforehand. With the assumed increase in 
survival rate, total longevity increases by 5.56 percent6 (see Figure 1b).  
By assuming both the changes above, the overall demographic changes regarding with the 
aging population are shown in Figure 1. The population of workers has declined (Figure 1c), 
                                                 
6
 The calculation is that (30 × 0.9 + 30)/(30 × 0.8 + 30) = 1.0556. 
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while the population of retirees spikes at period 3, before stabilising after period 4 (Figure 1d). 
During this process, the proportion of retirees rises from period 2 to 3. After that, it declines 
and then stays the same (Figure 1f). 
 
 
Figure 1. Overall Effect: Demography Changes 
3.2. Parameter Calibration 
To present the result numerically, we need assign values for the parameters. In this paper, 
we seek for feasible parameter values that fit the case of China because it will be a typical 
example when examining the effects of ageing on housing prices. For the parameters that has 
not been found under the context of China, we use the ones of America as a substitution. 
There are 16 parameters in our model. In Table 2, their calibrated values are listed, as well 
as the sources of the calibration. 
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The time preference of households 𝛽 is calibrated to match China’s average real interest 
rates during 1980–20157. According to World Development Indicators database8, this rate, 
rounded to two decimal places, is 2 percent, which indicates the annual discount factor of 
0.98, and for a period of thirty years, we set 𝛽 = 0.55. Besides, following Iacoviello and Neri 
(2010) and Ng (2015), the annual discount rate of firms is set as 0.958 (=0.98/1.0232), lower 
than that of the households. In thirty years, the corresponding discount rate of firms 𝛽𝑒 is 
0.275. 
Table 2—Parameter Calibration of the Model 
Description Symbols Values Sources 
Time preference of households 𝛽 0.55 See text 
Time preference of firms 𝛽𝑒 0.275 See text 
Capital share  
(non-housing sector) 
𝜇𝑐 0.46 Ng (2015) 
Capital share  
(housing sector) 
𝜇ℎ 0.24 See text 
Land share  
(housing sector) 
𝜇𝑙 0.10 Ng (2015) 
Adjustment Friction 
(non-housing sector) 
𝜙kc 11 Ng (2015) 
Adjustment Friction 
(housing sector) 
𝜙kh 10 Ng (2015) 
Capital depreciation 
(non-housing sector) 
𝛿kc 1 Ng (2015) 
Capital depreciation 
(housing sector) 
𝛿kh 1 Ng (2015) 
House depreciation 𝛿ℎ 0.7 Iacoviello and Neri (2010) 
Weight on housing in utility 𝑗ℎ 0.12 Ng (2015) 
Weight on land in utility 𝑗𝑙 0.045 
Liu, Wang, and Zha 
(2013) 
Dis-preference on Labour supply 𝜏 1 Ng (2015) 
See text 𝜂 0.5 Ng (2015) 
See text 𝜉 1 Ng (2015) 
Pension share 𝑇 0.4 
Iacoviello and Pavan 
(2013) 
 
There are three depreciation rates in our model. For the two types of capital in the production 
sectors, their annual depreciation rates are about 10 percent (Iacoviello and Neri 2010, Ng 
2015). In thirty years, this depreciation rate implies that the initial capital stock is fully 
depreciated. Thus, the corresponding parameters 𝛿kc  and 𝛿kh  are calibrated as 1. The 
depreciation rate of houses is calibrated according to Iacoviello and Neri (2010) as 4 percent 
annually9, indicating 70 percent depreciation of the stock in 30 years. 
                                                 
7
 Follow Blackburn and Cipriani (2002) and Muto, Oda, and Sudo (2016), the survival rates in the utility function do not influence the 
calibration methods of the parameter of time preference. 
8
World Development Indicator of the World Bank: Real interest rate.  
 Website: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/FR.INR.RINR. Date of Access: 21/Apr/2017 
9
 We did not use this parameter value in Ng (2015) because that value indicates the houses will close to be fully depreciated in 30 years, 
and this is not true in the reality. Thus, we use the parameter value in Iacoviello and Neri (2010) instead. 
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The parameters denoting income shares and weight of utility are calibrated according to Ng 
(2015) and Liu, Wang, and Zha (2013). Their values are listed in Table 2: the capital share in 
housing sector (𝜇ℎ) is set at 0.24
10. The capital adjustment cost in the non-housing and housing 
sector is calibrated according to Ng (2015), and the values are reported in Table 2. Among all 
the parameters, the value of pension share 𝑇 of China has not been found in similar studies. 
Here, we use the case of America as an alternative, and the value is calibrated according to the 
work of Iacoviello and Pavan (2013). 
4. Solution method 
Regarding the demographic changes, there are two exogenous variables in our model, i.e. the 
worker population growth rate, 𝛾𝑁,𝑡 , and the survival rate, 𝜋𝑡 . When the values of these 
exogenous variables change, their effects can be captured by the simulation11. 
However, when the worker population growth rate is negative as in our assumptions, the 
worker population declines permanently (see figure 1c). Because the worker population is not 
a variable in the model of per capita variables, we cannot use the simulations to detect the effect 
of this permanent change. 
To see this, note that the worker population growth rates are zero in both the original and end 
state. Thus, we will get the same value of the per worker land area 𝑙 for both the states from 
the simulation (if consider the changes in 𝛾𝑁,𝑡 only). Nevertheless, when the total land area is 
a constant, we know that the per worker land area 𝑙 will increase by 10 percent if the worker 
population declines by 10 percent. The values of other variables may also be affected, but the 
influence cannot be shown by the simulation. In this study, the influences are denoted by the 
trends of variables because they are determining the levels of variables. 
Besides the worker population, the changes in TFPs (𝐴𝑐,𝑡, 𝐴ℎ,𝑡, 𝐴𝑘,𝑡) and land area 𝐿𝑡 will 
also affect the levels of variables, and these effects are captured by the trend. Incorporating 
these factors are for general concerns to reveal their effects, and they will be assumed to be 
constants afterward. Correspondingly, we use the steady states to denote the values of the de-
trended variables that can be calculated by the simulation. Formally, for a variable 𝑋𝑡, its trend 
and steady state have the following relationship: 
                                                 
10
 Comparing with Iacoviello and Neri (2010) and Ng (2015), the intermediate input has been omitted here, and the share of this input is 
added to the capital. 
11
 The simulation is conducted with Dynare 4.5.6.  
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?̃?𝑡 =
𝑋𝑡
𝐺𝑡
(20) 
, where ?̃?𝑡 and 𝐺𝑡 denote the steady state and trend of the variable 𝑋 at period 𝑡. The model 
equations of de-trended variables are listed in the Appendix. In addition, we define the trend 
growth rate of 𝐺𝑡 as 𝑔𝑡 = ln(𝐺𝑡) − ln(𝐺𝑡−1). 
The algorithm calculating the trend of each variable is the same as that of calculating the 
balanced growth in the literature12. We demonstrate that the algorithm that has traditionally 
relied on the assumptions of constant growth rate in the exogenous variable applies to the more 
realistic case where the growth rates vary with time. This demonstration is under the following 
two assumptions: 
1) The steady states do not become zero or infinity.  
2) Trend growth rates are determined by changes in the contemporary exogenous variable. 
For the first assumption, the steady states do not become zero means that, in the model, every 
variable is a necessary component, and none of them can be neglected. Meanwhile, forbidding 
the steady states turning to infinity is to keep their economic meanings. For example, no 
consumption (in a finite period) could go infinity.  
In addition, the second assumption implies that the trend growth rates are time-varying with 
respect to the exogenous changes, and they are constants when the exogenous changes are 
fixed. Here, we say that two trend growth rates are different if there is a change in exogenous 
variables such that the two are unequal. In contrast, we say two trend growth rates are equal if 
they are equal for any change in exogenous variables. 
Based on the above assumptions, we present the algorithm in propositions, and the proofs 
are provided in the Appendix. In particular, we discuss the relationship of trend growth rates 
in two kinds of equations: linear and Cobb Douglas forms. The two kinds of equations are basic 
building-bricks in the Diamond family of OLG models, and they cover basic algebra including 
addition, subtraction, multiplication, and power. 
The linear equation has the form as follows: 
𝑋𝑡 = 𝑎𝑋1,𝑡 + 𝑏𝑋2,𝑡 (21) 
, where 𝑎 and b are non-zero parameters. Assuming variables 𝑋𝑡 , 𝑋1,𝑡  and 𝑋2,𝑡  have trends 
𝐺𝑡, 𝐺1,𝑡 and 𝐺2,𝑡, and the trend growth rates are 𝑔𝑡, 𝑔1,𝑡 and 𝑔2,𝑡. 
The Cobb-Douglas form equation that we are focusing on is shown as follows: 
                                                 
12
 See, for example, Jones (1995), İmrohoroğlu, İmrohoroğlu, and Joines (1999) and Iacoviello and Neri (2010). A clear illustration of the 
algorithm could be found in the appendix of Iacoviello and Neri (2010). 
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𝑋𝑡 = 𝑐𝑋1,𝑡
𝑎 𝑋2,𝑡−1
𝑏 (22) 
, where 𝑎, b and c are non-zero parameters. 
Proposition 1  
For the linear equation above, we have 𝐺1,𝑡 = 𝐺2,𝑡 = 𝐺𝑡 and 𝑔1,𝑡 = 𝑔2,𝑡 = 𝑔𝑡. 
Proposition 2 
For the Cobb-Douglas form above, we have 𝐺𝑡 = 𝐺1,𝑡
𝑎 𝐺2,𝑡
𝑏  and 𝑔𝑡 = 𝑎 𝑔1,𝑡 + 𝑏 𝑔2,𝑡. 
Recall that the steady states are calculated by simulations, and the trends can be derived 
according to the algorithm above. After having both, the growth rate of a variable is the sum 
of the growth rates of the steady state and the trend. To see this, we can rewrite the equation 
(20) into 𝑋𝑡 = ?̃?𝑡𝐺𝑡, and take log-difference on both sides. Then, we have: 
ln(𝑋𝑡) − ln(𝑋𝑡−1) = ln(?̃?𝑡) − ln(?̃?𝑡−1) + 𝑔𝑡 (23) 
, where ln(𝑋𝑡) − ln(𝑋𝑡−1) is the growth rate of the variable 𝑥 at period 𝑡. The terms ln(?̃?𝑡) −
ln(?̃?𝑡−1) and 𝑔𝑡 are growth rates of the steady state and trend respectively. 
5. Long-Term Projection 
A decline in fertility rate and an increase in longevity are both important underlying forces 
for aging of the population. We investigate the long-term effects of these two separately at first, 
and then combine them together to assess the aggregate changes. More concretely, since the 
long run effect could be reflected by trend or steady state changes, we are here looking for the 
specific values of these changes. 
5.1. Fertility Rate Decline 
As illustrated above, the fertility rate is the same in both the original and end states, so the 
steady states of variables are the same. Therefore, in the long run, the effect of the fertility rate 
decline would be revealed by the trends only.  
In particular, the trend growth rates of house and land prices have the following closed form 
solutions (the derivations are provided in Appendix B): 
𝑔𝑞,𝑡 =
1 − 𝜇ℎ
1 − 𝜇𝑐
𝛾ac,t − 𝛾ah,t +
𝜇𝑐(1 − 𝜇ℎ)
1 − 𝜇𝑐
𝛾ak,t + 𝜇𝑙(𝛾𝑁,𝑡 − 𝛾𝐿,𝑡) (24) 
𝑔𝑝𝑙,𝑡 =
1
1 − 𝜇𝑐
𝛾𝑎𝑐,𝑡 +
 𝜇𝑐
1 − 𝜇𝑐
𝛾𝑎𝑘,𝑡 + (𝛾𝑁,𝑡 − 𝛾𝐿,𝑡) (25) 
The meanings of the variables are listed in Table 3: 
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Table 3—Exogenous Variables in Trends 
𝛾𝑁 Growth rate of worker population 
𝛾𝐿 Growth rate of residential land area 
𝛾ac Growth rate of TFP in non-housing sector 
𝛾ah Growth rate of TFP in housing sector 
𝛾ak Growth rate of investment specific technology 
Specifically, the trend caused by fertility rate changes is reflected by the following equations, 
which neglect other exogenous variables from equations (24) and (25). 
𝑔𝑞,𝑡 = 𝜇𝑙𝛾𝑁,𝑡 (26) 
𝑔𝑝𝑙,𝑡 = 𝛾𝑁,𝑡 (27) 
The only parameter in equation (26) is 𝜇𝑙 , which represents the share of land in house 
construction. This parameter, as assumed in the previous section, has the range of 0 < 𝜇𝑙 < 1. 
Therefore, the effect of adjusting  𝛾𝑁 would be bigger on the land price than that of the house.  
The fertility rate 𝑛𝑡 is not shown in these formulas directly; however, the variables 𝛾𝑁,𝑡 and 
𝑛𝑡  have the relationship  𝑛𝑡 = exp(𝛾𝑁,𝑡) . Thus, when 𝛾𝑁,𝑡 = 0 , the fertility rate is at 
replacement level, meaning that the worker population is stable. A negative 𝛾𝑁  implies a 
decline in fertility rate, and so the worker population contracts. Accordingly, the proportion of 
retirees would increase commensurately.  
In this circumstance, the replacement level of fertility rate is essential for the price trends. If 
the fertility rate remains higher than the replacement level, then the prices would rise as a result. 
In contrast, if the fertility rate stays lower than the replacement level, then the price falls.  
The following result derived from (26) and (27) would sum up the discussion above:  
Result 1: A decline in the fertility rate lowers the house and land prices in the long run. 
Moreover, when 0 < 𝜇𝑙 < 1, the effect on the land price would be bigger than that on the 
house. 
The mechanisms from fertility rate to prices is presented in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2. Causal Chain from Fertility Rate to Prices 
In the first step, the fertility rate decline would lead to a contraction in the population of 
workers which then affects land and house prices. We will take the land price as an example to 
illustrate this effect. First, when worker population declines, the land price would fall because 
Fertility rate 
Worker  
Population 
Land price House price 
Non-housing Production 
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of reduced demand. Second, the decline in the population of workers will lead to a decline in 
non-housing production. Note that the land price is a relative price and is denoted by the units 
of non-housing production. Thus, when the output declines, the land price would decline 
accordingly.  
What about the price of houses? First note that house construction is endogenous in our 
model. Thus, the changes in population and productions may not influence the house price 
because of the flexibility of supply. However, land is an input in house construction and thus a 
fall in the price of land will be transmitted to the house price. As shown in (26), the parameter 
𝜇𝑙 denotes the share of land, which is also the share of price transmission. Since 0 < 𝜇𝑙 < 1, 
the decline in house price is less than that of land. 
Finally, the mechanisms illustrated above would indicate the price trend decline would 
happen along with the shrinkage of worker population, and the value of the decline can be 
calculated from equations (26) and (27). Substituting in the parameters from the previous 
section, the trends of house/land price are shown in Figure 3, where their values decline by 1 
percent and 10 percent, respectively. 
 
Figure 3. Price Changes: Long-Term Effect of Fertility Rate Decline 
Notes: The corresponding demographic changes are shown in Figure 1a.  
5.2. Longevity Increase 
As explained in the section on the solution method, the effect of an increase in longevity 
impacts on steady states instead of trends. 
There are three ways of calculating the effect on steady states: derive the analytical solution, 
calculate the partial derivative from the above, or use numerical simulations when the above is 
not practical. The first two have proved difficult thus numerical simulations have been 
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employed. By using parameter values and the changes in longevity, this method permits the 
calculation of steady-state values for the endogenous variable.  
Here, by using the calibrated parameters and assumptions in the previous section, the 
numerical solution is presented to show the long-term effect of an increase in longevity. The 
robustness of the results is checked as explained in Appendix D. The results of the numerical 
solution are shown in Figure 4. The effects of an increase in the survival rate from 0.8 to 0.9 
are calculated and plotted in this figure: it shows a positive impact on price of an increase in 
longevity.  
This result indicates that, for plausible calibrations of the structural parameters of the 
economy, the long-term effects of an increase in longevity on the prices is positive. In addition, 
as shown in Figure 4, the rise in the price of land is higher than that of the house. Thus, for the 
given parameters, the long-term effect of an increase in longevity on land price is larger than 
that on the house.  
 
Figure 4. Price Changes: Long-Term Effects of Longevity Increase 
Notes: the survival rate is incremented by 0.1 to derive the corresponding steady state prices for house and land separately.  
 
Result 2: the long-run effect of an increase in longevity is positive on both house and land 
prices. Moreover, its effect on the land price is bigger than that on the house price. 
5.3. Overall 
We next investigate combined effects of a fall in the fertility rate and an increase in longevity. 
More concretely, when using the assumed demographic changes in the previous section, their 
overall effects on the prices are shown in Table 4. 
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In the long run, the house price rises by 0.07 percent. This rise indicates that, conditional on 
the values of the assumed parameters, the positive effect on house price from an increase in 
longevity is greater than the negative effect from the fall in fertility. In contrast, the land price 
declines by 2.39 percent. Thus, the negative effect of the simulated fall in fertility outweighs 
the positive effect from the simulated increase in longevity.  
Table 4—Prices Changes: Long-Term Effect of Aging Population (in percent) 
 
effect of decline in 
 fertility rate 
effect of increase in 
longevity 
overall 
effect 
house price -1.00 1.07 0.07 
land price -10.00 7.61 -2.39 
Note: the numbers come from Figure 3 and 5, and the overall effect is the sum of the two. The justification of this 
method is shown in Appendix D. 
These offsetting effects can be deduced from Result 1 and Result 2. Recall from Result 1, 
the long-term effect of fertility rate decline on prices is negative; however, in Result 2, the 
long-term effect on prices of an increase in longevity is positive. Because these two effects 
move in opposite directions, the net effect depends on which of the above is overwhelming. 
Furthermore, if we manipulate the extent of fertility rate decline, these opposing effects could 
be studied more closely for specific parameter values. 
As shown in Figure 5, the Cartesian plane consists of the fertility rate decline (y-axis) and 
longevity increase (x-axis). The line pictured in the plane is a set of points, denoting 
combinations of fertility rate decline and longevity increase. For house price, on this line, the 
upward effect from longevity increase equals the downward effect from fertility rate decline. 
That is, the net effect of an aging population on house prices is zero on this line. 
  
Figure 5. Plane of Aging Population and Balance Line of House Price 
Notes: The effect of longevity increase on house price comes from Figure 4, and the effect of fertility rate decline is calculated 
according to (26). 
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Moreover, the line pictured in Figure 5 is also a dividing line. It divides the quadrant of the 
plane into two parts. On the right side of the line, the house price will rise in the long run, 
because of the stronger effect from an increase in longevity via-a-vis a fall in fertility. However, 
on the left side of the line, the house price will decline due to the weight of fertility rate decline. 
For land price, a similar plane is shown in Figure 6, together with a line, on which the long-
term effect of aging population is zero. Similar to that of the house price, the quadrant is also 
divided into two parts by this balance line, and its right / left side would be the upward / 
downward area for the land price.  
 
Figure 6. Plane of Aging Population and Balance Line of Land Price 
Notes: The effect of longevity increase on land price comes from Figure 4, and the effect of fertility rate decline is calculated 
according to (27). 
 
Figure 7. Plane of Aging Population and Balance Line of Land Price 
Notes: source from Figure 5 and 7. 
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Lastly, notice that the balance lines of house and land prices do not coincide with each other, 
which is shown in Figure 7. Thus, the zero long-run effect cannot be achieved for both the 
prices simultaneously. Moreover, the quadrant is divided into three areas by two different lines. 
Because the areas preserved the properties as in Figure 5 and 7, the right most area is where 
both land and house prices rise while left-most region is where both prices fall. The middle 
area lends room for the two prices to diverge: specifically where the price of land drops while 
that for houses increase. The parameters assumed in the calculations are those for this specific 
region as shown in Table 4. 
To sum up, the discussion above could be highlighted by the following result: 
Result 3: the aging population could have zero effect on either house or land price in the 
long run. 
6. Simulation 
In this section, we report on simulations of the economic effects of the demographic changes 
presented in Figure 1. Specifically, the simulations provide the dynamics in terms of household 
utility and housing prices during the transition periods. From these dynamics, we explain how 
the demographic changes and economic fluctuations are interconnected. The results have had 
trends involved according to (23). Thus, they are the overall dynamics of variables instead of 
steady states. 
6.1. Households’ Utility 
Aside from the negative utility from working, the household utility is determined by the non-
housing consumption and house and land owned per capita. If we divide the households into 
workers and retirees, their per capita utility is shown in Figure 8. The per capita consumption 
of workers is greater from that of period 1 in periods 2 to 4 (see Figure 8a) when workers own 
more houses and land both in the long run and short run (see Figure 8c, e). In contrast, the 
consumption of retirees decreases from period 2 and reaches its lowest point in period 3 (see 
Figure 8b). Although consumption rises from period 3 to 4, the long run per capita consumption 
is still below that of period 1 (the original state). Similar situations also happen in both the 
house and land owned by retirees on a per capita basis (see Figure 8d, f). 
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Figure 8. The Utility Dynamics (per capita) 
Note: the corresponding demographic changes are presented in Figure 1, both the fertility rate decline and longevity increase 
happen from period 2 to 3. 
The results in Figure 8 show that, relative to period 1 (the original state), the utility of workers 
is higher; however, the retirees’ utility is worse than their original state. We next discuss the 
retirees’ utility since workers’ behaviour is influenced by the expectations of their life in 
retirement. 
For retirees, in the long run, the decrease in utility is due to the increase in longevity which 
in turn raises the population of retirees. Compared with the case of no increase in longevity, 
the population of retirees rises by 12.5 percent. When the population rises, to keep the same 
utility level as before, it requires a rise of total income. However, the simulation indicates that 
in the long-run total income of retirees will rise by less than 1 percent thus per capita income 
and the utility of retirees fall. 
24 
 
During the transition period, the significant utility loss of retirees is due to the decline in the 
fertility rate. This decline leads to fewer workers and a concomitant rise in the proportion of 
retirees. Especially in period 3, the proportion of retirees would reach its peak (see Figure 1f), 
meaning that the pension income from workers would be shared by more retirees, leading to 
the most drastic losses in utility. After that, this utility will rise along with a decline in the 
proportion of retirees (see Figure 1f), and move towards its long run level. 
For the workers, their behaviour would be influenced by their expectations about the living 
standard of their retirement. In the long-run, the higher utility is due to the increased savings 
of workers. Recall that the utility loss would happen in households’ retirement period, the 
workers with rational expectation would increase their savings to fund their retirement so as to 
maximize their life-span utility. Specifically, the households, having perfect foresight of their 
future utility loss, would purchase more house and land when they are workers, and sell them 
when they retire. This purchase behaviour against the future utility loss raises the house and 
land owned by workers and with it their utility. 
During the transition period, the increased utility of workers comes from the fall in the 
fertility rate. Because of the fertility rate decline, the worker population decreases accordingly. 
However, the total income of workers will not decrease to the same extent. The key driver here 
is the wealth stock of the firms, including 𝐾𝑐,𝑡−1 , 𝐾ℎ,𝑡−1  and 𝐿𝑒,𝑡−1 (see equation (10) and 
(11)). When worker population declines, the adjustments of the wealth are not immediate, 
indicating higher per worker output in goods and houses. According to equation (16), higher 
per worker output and wealth stock translates into the income of workers through wages and 
profits. Thus, higher per capita income would accrue to workers, and their utility increases. 
Along with the adjustment of the wealth stock, workers’ utility will tend to converge towards 
its long run level.  
Based on the discussion above, we note that an aging population would increase inequality 
across generations. The utility of workers increases whereas that of the retirees falls. Especially 
in the transition periods, this growth in inequality would be significant. In these periods, as has 
been illustrated above, the significant aging population and the wealth stock adjustment would 
drive a wedge between the two generations. 
The results of this section can be concluded as follows: 
Result 4: the aging population could increase inequality across generations. Specifically, 
the utility of workers would rise while that of retirees would fall.  
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6.2. Prices 
The price dynamics following the demographic changes presented in Figure 1 is explained 
next. The house price rises from period 1 to 3, and then declines from period 3 to 4 (see Figure 
9). Meanwhile, the land price also rises from period 1 to 2, and declines from period 2 to 4 (see 
Figure 10).  
 
Figure 9. the Overall Dynamics of House Price 
Note: the corresponding demographic changes are presented in Figure 1, both the fertility rate decline and longevity increase 
happen from period 2 to 3. After that, the fertility rate moves back to the replacement level, while the longevity stays stable. 
 
Figure 10. the Overall Dynamics of Land Price 
Note: the corresponding demographic changes are presented in Figure 1, both the fertility rate decline and longevity increase 
happen from period 2 to 3. After that, the fertility rate moves back to the replacement level, while the longevity stays stable. 
As shown in Figure 9 and 10, the land price dynamics produce a turning point at period 2, 
while the turning point of the house price happens at period 3. Before these points, the prices 
are rising; however, after these points, the prices fall. What is the mechanism that connects the 
demographic change to the price movements? 
To explain these dynamics, the Euler Equations of house and land are listed: 
?̃?𝑡 = 𝛽𝐸𝑡(exp (𝑔𝑞,1+𝑡) ?̃?1+𝑡(1 − 𝛿ℎ)
𝑐1,𝑡
𝑐2,1+𝑡
) + 𝑗ℎ
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ℎ̃1,𝑡
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𝑝𝑙,𝑡 =  𝛽𝐸𝑡 (exp (𝑔pl,1+t) ?̃?𝑙,1+𝑡  
𝑐1,𝑡
𝑐2,1+𝑡
) + 𝑗𝑙
𝑐1,𝑡
𝑙1,𝑡
(29) 
, where the variables with a tilde denote their de-trended values.  
According to (28) and (29), the price dynamics are explained by the utility changes of 
households, which are presented in Figure 8. In the first step, we will emphasize that the utility 
changes and perfect foresight of households are driving prices to rise from period 1 to 2. 
As shown in Figure 8b, the per capita consumption of retirees would decline significantly 
from period 2 to 3. Given the assumption of perfect foresight of households, their behaviours 
would change accordingly and beforehand. The expected decline in consumption is denoted by 
𝐸𝑡(𝑐2,1+𝑡). According to (28) and (29), the decline of 𝐸𝑡(𝑐2,1+𝑡) will raise the house and land 
prices (?̃?𝑡 and 𝑝𝑙,𝑡) beforehand. Therefore, if the expected consumption decline would happen 
from period 2 to 3, then the price rises would precede period 2. This mechanism explains the 
price rise before the demographic changes. 
Intuitively, as explained in the household utility section, expectations drive the price rise. 
When a decline in consumption is anticipated, the households raise their savings by purchasing 
more housing and land when they are workers (see figure 8c, e). It is these purchases which 
drive the price rise. 
After period 2, the drop in the fertility rate tends to drag the prices down as discussed in the 
previous section. Specifically, the house and land prices should be lowered by 1 and 10 percent 
respectively from period 2 to 3 in terms of the fertility rate decline (see figure 3). However, the 
price dynamics show that the land price falls by 5 percent instead, and the house price even 
rises (see figure 9 and 10). What is the force supporting the prices?  
Here, this force comes from the character of stock of wealth. As discussed previously, the 
stock of wealth would not adjust immediately against a decline in the population of workers. 
Therefore, with these wealth stocks, the per capita income of workers in period 3 rises. More 
house and land would be purchased by using these incomes, and these purchases are supporting 
the price of these assets. This supporting force shapes the price dynamics by preventing the 
land price from sharp decline and postponing the turning point of the house price.  
Nevertheless, this supporting force fades away as the wealth stock is adjusted, and thus both 
the prices fall at period 4. The fading of this supporting force can be reflected by the workers’ 
consumption at period 4, which drops to its long run level (see figure 8a). According to (28) 
and (29), the per capita worker consumption 𝑐1,𝑡 is positively related to the housing prices. 
Thus, when the consumption declines, the housing prices would fall along with it. 
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In particular, the land price reaches its long run level at period 4, but the house price 
overshoots (see figure 9 and 10). Why? This further decline of house price is explained from 
changes in the house stock. To illustrate, we should notice that the house stock ℎ̃1,𝑡  is not 
adjusting simultaneously with the consumption (see Figure 8c). Because of the depreciation 
character of house stock, the adjustment would not be immediate, but take place gradually. 
Based on (28), a higher ℎ̃1,𝑡 indicates a lower house price. Thus, in period 4, because ℎ̃1,𝑡 is 
higher than its long run level, the price would have a further fall. This mechanism enriches the 
discussion about overshooting phenomena that started with Dornbusch (1976). 
In sum, connections between demographic changes and price dynamics are presented above, 
and these connections could be summarized by the following result: 
Result 5: aging population could cause turning points in housing prices. 
Although this result is based on the specific demographic changes presented in the previous 
section, it is theoretically grounded as shown in Figure 7– an issue under current investigation.  
7. Conclusion 
The effect of an aging population on housing prices remains an unresolved issue with mixed 
empirical findings. This debate began with Mankiw and Weil (1989) and has been ongoing 
since. Here we build an overlapping generations model where aging results from a combination 
of a decline in fertility and an increase in longevity to simulate effects of the above on housing 
prices. Our simulations for plausible parameter values give mixed results, depending on which 
of the above-mentioned overwhelms in terms of the impact of aging on house (and land) prices.   
This paper has tackled the impact of aging on housing prices from a theoretical perspective. 
Our result provides reasons for the mixed results shown through empirical studies.  It shows 
that a decline in the fertility rate depresses housing prices while an increase in longevity does 
the opposite – the net effect of a simultaneous change in the above two factors depends on 
which effect is overwhelming. Note that aging is caused by a combination of a fall in fertility 
with an increase in longevity, but the exact magnitude of the afore-mentioned differs across 
contexts. More concretely, in the long run, housing prices will decline if the drag of a fall in 
fertility outweighs the push from an increase in longevity, and vice versa. This result may 
explain the mixed findings from existing empirical research. 
If indeed true, then what does the above imply for the price trends for housing in the future? 
Our simulations predict sharp turning points in housing prices when the upward effect is 
overwhelmed by the current declines in the rate of fertility. The turning points are revealed by 
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the simulations and explained theoretically. Before the turning points, the prices would rise in 
anticipation of a longer life span by existing population of workers and thus the need for more 
wealth to fund retirement. Nevertheless, the decline afterwards is due to the decrease of worker 
population caused by the lower fertility rate. Although the wealth stock would temporary 
support the housing prices, the price declines would continue when this support effect fades 
away.  
Furthermore, household behaviour has also been discussed in this paper, and the analysis 
showed that the demographic changes would lead to welfare inequality across generations. 
More concretely, the utility of workers will be higher; however, that of retirees will be lower 
(see Figure 8). This inequality would be most significant during the transition periods.  
In sum, this paper contributes to the literature on the effects of aging – a phenomenon that is 
spreading across the world – which will affect housing prices but the exact magnitudes will 
differ by context and change with time.  The next challenge, which is part of ongoing research, 
is to test these predictions using data on aging societies. These findings will deepen our 
understanding of the relationship between aging and the economy. 
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Appendix A. per capita Version Model Equations 
The per capita version model equations are transformed from the corresponding aggregate 
equations, and the derivation is based on Eq. (1), (2), (3) in the demography section. 
Households: For each generation, the budget constraint is shown by variables in lower case 
denoting per capita amount of that generation. 
𝑐𝑡,1 + 𝑞𝑡ℎ𝑡,1 + 𝑝𝑙,𝑡𝑙𝑡,1 = (1 − 𝑇)(𝑤𝑐,𝑡𝑛𝑐,𝑡 + 𝑤ℎ,𝑡𝑛ℎ,𝑡 + 𝑑𝑡) (𝐴1) 
𝑐1+𝑡,2 + 𝑞1+𝑡ℎ1+𝑡,2 + 𝑝𝑙,1+𝑡𝑙1+𝑡,2 =
𝑞1+𝑡(1 − 𝛿ℎ) (
ℎ𝑡,1
𝜋1+𝑡
+
𝜋𝑡ℎ𝑡,2
𝜋1+𝑡𝑛𝑡
) + 𝑇(𝑑1+𝑡 + 𝑛𝑐,1+𝑡𝑤𝑐,1+𝑡 + 𝑛ℎ,1+𝑡𝑤ℎ,1+𝑡)
𝑛1+𝑡
𝜋1+𝑡
+𝑝𝑙,1+𝑡 (
𝑙ℎ,𝑡,1
𝜋1+𝑡
+
𝜋𝑡𝑙𝑡,2
𝜋1+𝑡𝑛𝑡
) (𝐴2)
 
Firms: For firms, the variables in lower case represent the amount per worker.  
𝑦𝑡 = 𝐴𝑐,𝑡  (
𝑘𝑐,𝑡−1
𝑛𝑡
)
𝜇𝑐
 𝑛𝑐,𝑡
1−𝜇𝑐 (𝐴3) 
ih𝑡 = 𝐴ℎ,𝑡  (
𝑘ℎ,𝑡−1
𝑛𝑡
)
𝜇ℎ
 (
𝑙𝑒,𝑡−1
𝑛𝑡
)
𝜇𝑙
 𝑛ℎ,𝑡
1−𝜇ℎ−𝜇𝑙 (𝐴4) 
𝑘𝑐,𝑡 = (1 − 𝛿kc)
𝑘𝑐,𝑡−1
𝑛𝑡
+ ik𝑐,𝑡 − 𝜙𝑐,𝑡 (𝐴5) 
𝑘ℎ,𝑡 = (1 − 𝛿kh)
𝑘ℎ,𝑡−1
𝑛𝑡
+ ikℎ,𝑡 − 𝜙ℎ,𝑡 (𝐴6) 
𝜙𝑐,𝑡 = 𝜙𝑐(𝑘𝑐,𝑡, 𝑘𝑐,𝑡−1) =
𝜙𝑘𝑐
2
(
𝑘𝑐,𝑡𝑛𝑡
𝑘𝑐,𝑡−1
− exp (𝑔𝐾𝐶,𝑡))
2
𝑘𝑐,𝑡−1
𝑛𝑡
(𝐴7) 
𝜙ℎ,𝑡 = 𝜙ℎ(𝑘ℎ,𝑡, 𝑘ℎ,𝑡−1) =
𝜙𝑘ℎ
2
(
𝑘ℎ,𝑡𝑛𝑡
𝑘ℎ,𝑡−1
− exp (𝑔𝐾𝐻,𝑡))
2
𝑘ℎ,𝑡−1
𝑛𝑡
(𝐴8) 
𝑑𝑡 +
𝑘𝑐,𝑡
𝐴𝑘,𝑡
+ 𝑘ℎ,𝑡 + 𝑤𝑐,𝑡𝑛𝑐,𝑡 + 𝑤ℎ,𝑡𝑛ℎ,𝑡 + 𝑝𝑙,𝑡𝑙𝑒,𝑡 +
𝜙𝑐,𝑡
𝐴𝑘,𝑡
+ 𝜙ℎ,𝑡 =
𝑦𝑡 + 𝑞𝑡  ih𝑡 +
1 − 𝛿kc
𝐴𝑘,𝑡
𝑘𝑐,𝑡−1
𝑛𝑡
+ (1 − 𝛿kh)
𝑘ℎ,𝑡−1
𝑛𝑡
+ 𝑝𝑙,𝑡
𝑙𝑒,𝑡−1
𝑛𝑡
(𝐴9)
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Equilibrium: 
𝑦𝑡 = 𝑐𝑡 +
ik𝑐,𝑡
𝐴𝑘,𝑡
+ ikℎ,𝑡 − 𝜙𝑡 (𝐴10) 
ℎ𝑡 = ih𝑡 + (1 − 𝛿ℎ)
ℎ𝑡−1
𝑛𝑡
(𝐴11) 
𝑙𝑡 = 𝑙ℎ,𝑡 + 𝑙𝑒,𝑡 (𝐴12) 
, where 𝑐𝑡 = 𝑐𝑡,1 +
𝜋𝑡
𝑛𝑡
𝑐𝑡,2, ℎ𝑡 = ℎ𝑡,1 +
𝜋𝑡
𝑛𝑡
ℎ𝑡,2, 𝑙ℎ,𝑡 = 𝑙ℎ,𝑡,1 +
𝜋𝑡
𝑛𝑡
𝑙ℎ,𝑡,2. 
Appendix B. Trends 
The proof of the algorithm 
Proposition 1  
For the linear equation (21), we have 𝐺1,𝑡 = 𝐺2,𝑡 = 𝐺𝑡 and 𝑔1,𝑡 = 𝑔2,𝑡 = 𝑔𝑡. 
Proof 
We will prove that the unequal trend growth rates cannot exist according to our assumptions. 
If not, then there are exogenous variable changes such that the growth rates are not equal. In 
this circumstance, we fix the exogenous change so that the unequal trend growth rates are 
constants, i.e. 𝐺𝑡 = (exp (𝑔))
𝑡 > 0, 𝐺1,𝑡 = (exp (𝑔1))
𝑡 > 0, 𝐺2,𝑡 = (exp (𝑔2))
𝑡 > 0 . The 
inequality implies that there are some growth rates smaller than the others. Without loss of 
generality, we assume that 𝑔 ≤ 𝑔𝑖 and at least one of the inequality is strict
13.  
We rewrite the equation (21) as follows: 
𝑋𝑡
𝐺𝑡
= 𝑎
𝑋1,𝑡
𝐺1,𝑡
𝐺1,𝑡
𝐺𝑡
+ 𝑏
𝑋2,𝑡
𝐺2,𝑡
𝐺2,𝑡
𝐺𝑡
 
?̃?𝑡 = 𝑎?̃?1,𝑡
𝐺1,𝑡
𝐺𝑡
+ 𝑏?̃?2,𝑡
𝐺2,𝑡
𝐺𝑡
 
?̃?𝑡 = 𝑎?̃?1,𝑡 (
exp(𝑔1)
exp(𝑔)
)
𝑡
+ 𝑏?̃?2,𝑡 (
exp (𝑔2)
exp(𝑔)
)
𝑡
(𝐵1) 
In equation (B1), at least one of the terms (
exp (𝑔𝑖)
exp (𝑔)
)𝑡  would go infinity when 𝑡 → +∞ . 
Consequently, the steady state ?̃?𝑡 would become infinity if ?̃?𝑖,𝑡 are not zero. Either the way, it 
                                                 
13
 In case that it is 𝑔1 smaller than the others, we can rewrite equation (4) into 𝑋1,𝑡 = 𝑎′𝑋𝑡 + 𝑏′𝑋2,𝑡, where 𝑎
′ =
1
𝑎
 and 𝑏′ = −
𝑏
𝑎
. The other 
situations are similar. 
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violates the assumption one. Thus, for any exogenous change, we have 𝑔1,𝑡 = 𝑔2,𝑡 = 𝑔𝑡 and 
𝐺1,𝑡 = 𝐺2,𝑡 = 𝐺𝑡.    # 
Proposition 2 
For the Cobb-Douglas form equation (22), we have 𝐺𝑡 = 𝐺1,𝑡
𝑎 𝐺2,𝑡
𝑏  and 𝑔𝑡 = 𝑎 𝑔1,𝑡 + 𝑏 𝑔2,𝑡. 
Proof 
The logic is the same as the proof of the proposition 1. Divide both sides of the equation (22) 
by 𝐺𝑡 and we derive the equation as follows: 
?̃?𝑡 =
𝑋𝑡
𝐺𝑡
= 𝑐
𝑋1,𝑡
𝑎 𝑋2,𝑡−𝑖
𝑏
𝐺𝑡
= 𝑐 (
𝑋1,𝑡
𝐺1,𝑡
)
𝑎
(
𝑋2,𝑡−1
𝐺2,𝑡
)
𝑏
𝐺1,𝑡
𝑎 𝐺2,𝑡
𝑏
𝐺𝑡
= 𝑐?̃?1,𝑡
𝑎 (
?̃?2,𝑡−1
exp (𝑔2,𝑡)
)
𝑏
𝐺1,𝑡
𝑎 𝐺2,𝑡
𝑏
𝐺𝑡
 
If 𝐺𝑡 ≠ 𝐺1,𝑡
𝑎 𝐺2,𝑡
𝑏 , then there are exogenous variable changes satisfy this inequality. Similar to 
the proof in proposition 1, we fix the exogenous change and the unequal trend growth rates 
would be constants. Then, the term 
𝐺1,𝑡
𝑎 𝐺2,𝑡
𝑏
𝐺𝑡
 will turn to zero or infinity when 𝑡 → +∞. To hold 
the equation, the steady states would become either zero or infinity, and thus violate the 
assumption one. Therefore, for any change in exogenous variables, we have 𝐺𝑡 = 𝐺1,𝑡
𝑎 𝐺2,𝑡
𝑏 . 
Taking log-difference operation on both sides of 𝐺𝑡 = 𝐺1,𝑡
𝑎 𝐺2,𝑡
𝑏 , we have: 
𝑙𝑛𝐺𝑡 − 𝑙𝑛𝐺𝑡−1 = 𝑎(𝑙𝑛𝐺1,𝑡 − 𝑙𝑛𝐺1,𝑡−1) + 𝑏(𝑙𝑛𝐺2,𝑡 − 𝑙𝑛𝐺2,𝑡−1) 
According to equation (3), the above equation can be written as 𝑔𝑡 = 𝑎 𝑔1,𝑡 + 𝑏 𝑔2,𝑡.    # 
Remark 1 
The conclusion in proposition 1 can be extended when there are more linear terms in equation 
(4), i.e. 𝐺𝑡 = 𝐺1,𝑡 = 𝐺2,𝑡 = ⋯. 
Remark 2 
The conclusion in proposition 2 can be extended when there are more terms multiplied in the 
right-hand side of the equation (7). For example, when 𝑋𝑡 = 𝑑𝑋1,𝑡
𝑎 𝑋2,𝑡−1
𝑏 𝑋3,𝑡−1
𝑐 , we have 𝑔𝑡 =
𝑎 𝑔1,𝑡 + 𝑏 𝑔2,𝑡 + 𝑐 𝑔3,𝑡. 
Remark 3 
The relationship of the trend growth rates is contemporaneous, and thus the time subscript 
can be omitted.  
So far, the algorithm that calculates balanced growth rates in literature is shown to be held 
in more general circumstance under the two assumptions we made.  
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The exogenous variables that causing trend changes have been listed in Table 3. In addition, 
we assume that the per worker labour supplies, 𝑛𝑐,𝑡 and 𝑛ℎ,𝑡, do not have trends. The trends of 
other variables are calculated as follows. 
The per worker land area is calculated as: 
𝑙𝑡 =
𝐿𝑡
𝑁1,𝑡
 
Denote the growth rates of worker population and land area by 𝛾𝑁,𝑡 and 𝛾𝐿,𝑡 respectively, the 
per worker land area growth rate can be calculated according to the proposition 2 as: 
𝑔𝑙,𝑡 = 𝛾𝐿,𝑡 − 𝛾𝑁,𝑡 (𝐵2) 
According to Eq. (A12) and the proposition 1, the variables 𝑙𝑒,𝑡 have the same trend growth 
rate as 𝑙𝑡, i.e. 𝑔𝑙,𝑡. Based on Eq. (A9) and the proposition 1, the terms 𝑝𝑙,𝑡𝑙𝑒,𝑡 and 
𝑘𝑐,𝑡
𝐴𝑘,𝑡
 have the 
same growth rate as the variable 𝑦𝑡, and this relationship can be described by: 
𝑔𝑦,𝑡 = 𝑔𝑝𝑙,𝑡 + 𝑔𝑙,𝑡 = 𝑔𝑘𝑐,𝑡 − 𝛾𝑎𝑘,𝑡 (𝐵3) 
We have known 𝑔𝑙,𝑡 (see Eq. (B2)), if we can describe 𝑔𝑦,𝑡 using exogenous variables, the 
trend growth rate of land price 𝑔𝑝𝑙,𝑡 would be calculated according to the above equation. 
Use Eq. (A3) and the proposition 2, 𝑔𝑦,𝑡 can be calculated as: 
𝑔𝑦,𝑡 = 𝛾𝑎𝑐,𝑡 + 𝜇𝑐𝑔𝑘𝑐,𝑡 (𝐵4) 
Use Eq. (B3) and (B4), the 𝑔𝑦,𝑡 can be described as: 
𝑔𝑦,𝑡 =
1
1 − 𝜇𝑐
𝛾𝑎𝑐,𝑡 +
 𝜇𝑐
1 − 𝜇𝑐
𝛾𝑎𝑘,𝑡 (𝐵5) 
Thus, according to Eq. (B3), the trend growth rate of land price is: 
𝑔𝑝𝑙,𝑡 =
1
1 − 𝜇𝑐
𝛾𝑎𝑐,𝑡 +
 𝜇𝑐
1 − 𝜇𝑐
𝛾𝑎𝑘,𝑡 + (𝛾𝑁,𝑡 − 𝛾𝐿,𝑡) (𝐵6) 
Next, we will derive the trend growth rate of house price. According to Eq. (A4) and the 
proposition 2, the trend growth rate of ih𝑡 is: 
𝑔𝑖ℎ,𝑡 = 𝛾𝑎ℎ,𝑡 + 𝜇ℎ𝑔𝑘ℎ,𝑡 + 𝜇𝑙𝑔𝑙,𝑡 (𝐵7) 
From Eq. (A9), propositions 1 and 2, we can get: 
𝑔𝑦,𝑡 = 𝑔𝑘ℎ,𝑡 = 𝑔𝑖ℎ,𝑡 + 𝑔𝑞,𝑡 (𝐵8) 
Based on Eq. (B3), (B5), (B7) and (B8), the trend growth rates of house and house price are: 
𝑔𝑖ℎ,𝑡 = 𝛾ah,t +
 𝜇ℎ
1 − 𝜇𝑐
𝛾ac,t +
 𝜇𝑐 𝜇ℎ
1 − 𝜇𝑐
𝛾ak,t − 𝜇𝑙(𝛾𝑁,𝑡 + 𝛾𝐿,𝑡) (𝐵9) 
𝑔𝑞,𝑡 =
1 − 𝜇ℎ
1 − 𝜇𝑐
𝛾ac,t − 𝛾ah,t +
𝜇𝑐(1 − 𝜇ℎ)
1 − 𝜇𝑐
𝛾ak,t + 𝜇𝑙(𝛾𝑁,𝑡 − 𝛾𝐿,𝑡) (𝐵10) 
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Assuming that all the exogenous variables are zero except the worker population growth rate 
𝛾𝑁,𝑡, the trend growth rates above can be written as follows: 
𝑔𝑙,𝑡 = −𝛾𝑁,𝑡 (𝐵11) 
𝑔𝑝𝑙,𝑡 = 𝛾𝑁,𝑡 (𝐵12) 
𝑔𝑖ℎ,𝑡 = −𝜇𝑙𝛾𝑁,𝑡 (𝐵13) 
𝑔𝑞,𝑡 = 𝜇𝑙𝛾𝑁,𝑡 (𝐵14) 
Because 𝑔𝑦,𝑡 = 0 in this circumstance, according to budget constraint equations in Appendix 
A, the per capita variables such as wages, profits, consumptions and capitals also have no trend. 
Meanwhile, based on the equilibrium equations in the appendix A, the variables 𝑙ℎ,𝑡,1, 𝑙ℎ,𝑡,2 and 
𝑙ℎ,𝑡 have the same trend growth rate as 𝑙𝑡. Similarly, the variables ℎ𝑡,1, ℎ𝑡,2 and ℎ𝑡 have the 
same trend growth rate as 𝑖ℎ𝑡.  
Appendix C. De-trended Equations and First Order Conditions 
Using the equations in the appendix B, the equations in the appendix A can be written in de-
trended form. We list these equations as follows, as well as the de-trended first order conditions 
of households and firms. 
Households:  
?̃?𝑡,1 + ?̃?𝑡ℎ̃𝑡,1 + 𝑝𝑙,𝑡𝑙𝑡,1 = (1 − 𝑇)(?̃?𝑐,𝑡?̃?𝑐,𝑡 + ?̃?ℎ,𝑡?̃?ℎ,𝑡 + ?̃?𝑡) (𝐶1) 
?̃?1+𝑡,2 + ?̃?1+𝑡ℎ̃1+𝑡,2 + 𝑝𝑙,1+𝑡𝑙1+𝑡,2 =
?̃?1+𝑡(1 − 𝛿ℎ) (
ℎ̃𝑡,1
𝜋1+𝑡 exp(𝑔ℎ,𝑡+1)
+
𝜋𝑡ℎ̃𝑡,2
𝜋1+𝑡𝑛𝑡 exp(𝑔ℎ,𝑡+1)
) +
𝑇(?̃?1+𝑡 + ?̃?𝑐,1+𝑡?̃?𝑐,1+𝑡 + ?̃?ℎ,1+𝑡?̃?ℎ,1+𝑡)
𝑛1+𝑡
𝜋1+𝑡
+
𝑝𝑙,1+𝑡 (
𝑙ℎ,𝑡,1
𝜋1+𝑡 exp(𝑔𝑙,𝑡+1)
+
𝜋𝑡𝑙𝑡,2
𝜋1+𝑡𝑛𝑡 exp(𝑔𝑙,𝑡+1)
) (𝐶2)
 
First Order Conditions of Households: 
The households choose the following variables: 𝑐𝑡,1, ℎ𝑡,1, 𝑙𝑡,1, 𝑛𝑐,𝑡, 𝑛ℎ,𝑡, 𝑐1+𝑡,2, ℎ1+𝑡,2, 𝑙1+𝑡,2. 
The utility maximization of households have the first-order conditions as follows: 
?̃?𝑡
?̃?𝑡,1
=
𝑗ℎ
ℎ̃𝑡,1
+
𝛽(1 − 𝛿ℎ) 𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝑔𝑞,𝑡+1) ?̃?1+𝑡
?̃?1+𝑡,2
(𝐶3) 
?̃?1+𝑡
?̃?1+𝑡,2
=
𝑗ℎ
ℎ̃1+𝑡,2
(𝐶4) 
𝑝𝑙,𝑡
?̃?𝑡,1
=
𝑗𝑙
𝑙ℎ,𝑡,1
+
𝛽 𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝑔𝑝𝑙,𝑡+1) 𝑝𝑙,1+𝑡
?̃?1+𝑡,2
(𝐶5) 
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𝑝𝑙,1+𝑡
?̃?1+𝑡,2
=
𝑗𝑙
𝑙ℎ,1+𝑡,2
(𝐶6) 
(1 − 𝑇)?̃?𝑐,𝑡
?̃?𝑡,1
= 𝜏?̃?𝑐,𝑡
𝜉
(?̃?𝑐,𝑡
1+𝜉
+ ?̃?ℎ,𝑡
1+𝜉
)
𝜂−𝜉
1+𝜉 (𝐶7) 
(1 − 𝑇)?̃?ℎ,𝑡
?̃?𝑡,1
= 𝜏?̃?ℎ,𝑡
𝜉
(?̃?𝑐,𝑡
1+𝜉
+ ?̃?ℎ,𝑡
1+𝜉
)
𝜂−𝜉
1+𝜉 (𝐶8) 
Firms:  
?̃?𝑡 = 𝐴𝑐,𝑡  (
?̃?𝑐,𝑡−1
𝑛𝑡
)
𝜇𝑐
 ?̃?𝑐,𝑡
1−𝜇𝑐 (𝐶9) 
ih̃𝑡 = 𝐴ℎ,𝑡  (
?̃?ℎ,𝑡−1
𝑛𝑡
)
𝜇ℎ
 (
𝑙𝑒,𝑡−1
𝑛𝑡 exp(𝑔𝑙,𝑡+1)
)
𝜇𝑙
 ?̃?ℎ,𝑡
1−𝜇ℎ−𝜇𝑙 (𝐶10) 
?̃?𝑐,𝑡 = (1 − 𝛿kc)
?̃?𝑐,𝑡−1
𝑛𝑡
+ ik̃𝑐,𝑡 (𝐶11) 
?̃?ℎ,𝑡 = (1 − 𝛿kh)
?̃?ℎ,𝑡−1
𝑛𝑡
+ ik̃ℎ,𝑡 (𝐶12) 
?̃?𝑐,𝑡 = 𝜙𝑐(?̃?𝑐,𝑡, ?̃?𝑐,𝑡−1) =
𝜙𝑘𝑐
2
𝑛𝑡 (
?̃?𝑐,𝑡
?̃?𝑐,𝑡−1
− 1)
2
?̃?𝑐,𝑡−1 (𝐶13) 
?̃?ℎ,𝑡 = 𝜙ℎ(?̃?ℎ,𝑡, ?̃?ℎ,𝑡−1) =
𝜙𝑘ℎ
2
𝑛𝑡 (
?̃?ℎ,𝑡
?̃?ℎ,𝑡−1
− 1)
2
?̃?ℎ,𝑡−1 (𝐶14) 
Here, exp (𝑔𝐾𝐶,𝑡) and exp (𝑔𝐾𝐻,𝑡) are equal to the fertility rate 𝑛𝑡  because 𝑔𝐾𝐶,𝑡 = 𝑔𝑘𝑐,𝑡 +
𝛾𝑛,𝑡 and 𝑔𝑘𝑐,𝑡 = 0 according to the above discussion.  
?̃?𝑡 + ?̃?𝑐,𝑡 + ?̃?ℎ,𝑡 + ?̃?𝑐,𝑡?̃?𝑐,𝑡 + ?̃?ℎ,𝑡?̃?ℎ,𝑡 + 𝑝𝑙,𝑡𝑙𝑒,𝑡 + ?̃?𝑐,𝑡 + ?̃?ℎ,𝑡 =
?̃?𝑡 + ?̃?𝑡 ih̃𝑡 + (1 − 𝛿kc)
?̃?𝑐,𝑡−1
𝑛𝑡
+ (1 − 𝛿kh)
?̃?ℎ,𝑡−1
𝑛𝑡
+ 𝑝𝑙,𝑡
𝑙𝑒,𝑡−1
𝑛𝑡 exp(𝑔𝑙,𝑡)
(𝐶15)
 
First Order Conditions of Firms: 
The firms will decide on the following variables: 𝑘𝑐,𝑡, 𝑘ℎ,𝑡, 𝑑𝑡, 𝑛𝑐,𝑡, 𝑛ℎ,𝑡, 𝑙𝑒,𝑡. The first order 
condition with respect to 𝑘𝑐,𝑡 is: 
𝛽𝑒 (
1 − 𝛿kc
𝑛𝑡+1
− ?̃?(0,1)(?̃?𝑐,𝑡+1, ?̃?𝑐,𝑡) + ?̃?𝑐,𝑡+1)
?̃?𝑡+1
=
1
𝐴𝑘,𝑡
+ ?̃?(1,0)(?̃?𝑐,𝑡, ?̃?𝑐,𝑡−1)
?̃?𝑡
(𝐶16) 
Where:  
?̃?𝑐,𝑡+1 = ?̃?
(1,0)(?̃?𝑐,𝑡, ?̃?𝑐,𝑡+1) = 𝜇𝑐
?̃?𝑡+1
?̃?𝑐,𝑡
(𝐶17) 
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?̃?(0,1)(?̃?𝑐,𝑡+1, ?̃?𝑐,𝑡) = −
𝜙𝑘𝑐𝑛𝑡+1
2
((
?̃?𝑐,𝑡+1
?̃?𝑐,𝑡
)2 − 1) (𝐶18) 
?̃?(1,0)(?̃?𝑐,𝑡, ?̃?𝑐,𝑡−1) = 𝜙𝑘𝑐𝑛𝑡 (
?̃?𝑐,𝑡
?̃?𝑐,𝑡−1
− 1) (𝐶19) 
Similarly, the first order condition with respect to 𝑘ℎ,𝑡 is: 
𝛽𝑒 (
1 − 𝛿kh
𝑛𝑡+1
− ?̃?(0,1)(?̃?ℎ,𝑡+1, ?̃?ℎ,𝑡) + ?̃?ℎ,𝑡+1)
?̃?𝑡+1
=
1 + ?̃?(1,0)(?̃?ℎ,𝑡, ?̃?ℎ,𝑡−1)
?̃?𝑡
(𝐶20) 
Where:  
?̃?ℎ,𝑡+1 = 𝑞1+𝑡𝑖ℎ̃
(1,0,0)(?̃?ℎ,𝑡, ?̃?ℎ,𝑡+1, 𝑙𝑒,𝑡) = 𝜇ℎ
?̃?1+𝑡𝑖ℎ̃𝑡+1
?̃?ℎ,𝑡
(𝐶21) 
𝜙(0,1)(?̃?ℎ,𝑡+1, ?̃?ℎ,𝑡) = −
𝜙𝑘ℎ𝑛𝑡+1
2
((
?̃?ℎ,𝑡+1
?̃?ℎ,𝑡
)2 − 1) (𝐶22) 
𝜙(1,0)(?̃?ℎ,𝑡, ?̃?ℎ,𝑡−1) = 𝜙𝑘ℎ𝑛𝑡 (
?̃?ℎ,𝑡
?̃?ℎ,𝑡−1
− 1) (𝐶23) 
The first order condition with respect to 𝑙𝑒,𝑡 is: 
𝑝𝑙,𝑡
?̃?𝑡
=
𝛽𝑒 𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝑔𝑝𝑙,𝑡+1) (
𝑝𝑙,1+𝑡
𝑛1+𝑡
+ ?̃?𝑙,𝑡+1)
?̃?1+𝑡
(𝐶24) 
Here,  
?̃?𝑙,𝑡+1 = ?̃?1+𝑡ih̃
(0,0,1)(?̃?ℎ,𝑡, ?̃?ℎ,1+𝑡, 𝑙𝑒,𝑡) = 𝜇ℎ 𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝑔𝑝𝑙,𝑡+1) 
?̃?1+𝑡𝑖ℎ̃𝑡+1
𝑙𝑒,𝑡
(𝐶25)
e first order conditions with respect to 𝑛𝑐,𝑡 and 𝑛ℎ,𝑡 are: 
?̃?𝑐,𝑡 = (1 − 𝜇𝑐)
?̃?𝑡
?̃?𝑐,𝑡
(𝐶26) 
?̃?ℎ,𝑡 = (1 − 𝜇ℎ − 𝜇𝑙)
?̃?𝑡𝑖ℎ̃𝑡
?̃?ℎ,𝑡
(𝐶27) 
Equilibrium: 
?̃?𝑡 = ?̃?𝑡 + ik̃𝑐,𝑡 + ik̃ℎ,𝑡 + ?̃?𝑡 (𝐶28) 
ℎ̃𝑡 = ih̃𝑡 + (1 − 𝛿ℎ)
ℎ̃𝑡−1
𝑛𝑡 exp(𝑔ℎ,𝑡)
(𝐶29) 
𝑙𝑡 = 𝑙ℎ,𝑡 + 𝑙𝑒,𝑡 (𝐶30) 
, where ?̃?𝑡 = ?̃?𝑡,1 +
𝜋𝑡
𝑛𝑡
?̃?𝑡,2, ℎ̃𝑡 = ℎ̃𝑡,1 +
𝜋𝑡
𝑛𝑡
ℎ̃𝑡,2, 𝑙ℎ,𝑡 = 𝑙ℎ,𝑡,1 +
𝜋𝑡
𝑛𝑡
𝑙ℎ,𝑡,2. 
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Appendix D. Robustness Check 
In this section, we will examine the robustness of long-term effect of an increase in longevity 
on housing prices. Specifically, we change the calibrated parameter values to assess their 
effects on the numerical outcomes. More concretely, each calibrated parameter incremented by 
10 percent and the effects on house (and land) prices assessed. To make the results comparable 
to the original one, the same demographic change would be applied, i.e. survival rate rise from 
0.8 to 0.9. If the above results about longevity increase is robust, then the parameter changes 
should only make modest changes on the result.  
For the land price, the check for robustness is shown in Figure D1. Comparing with the 
original result, which is shown at the left most, the price changes are modest. The biggest 
difference lay on the time preference 𝛽 and tax rate 𝑇, however, none of their effects is bigger 
than 2 percent. Thus, the numerical solution of land price changes is considered to be robust. 
Similarly, the check for robustness of house price to changes in longevity is shown in Figure 
D2. Like that of the land price, the longevity increase effect on house price would only be 
affected modestly by parameter value changes. Therefore, the result on the house price is also 
robust in this circumstance. 
   
Figure D1. Robustness check: Effect of Longevity Increase on Land Price 
Notes: From left to right, the first bar in chart is the land price change when parameters are calibrated to their original values. 
Then, we change the parameter values one by one. Each parameter is increased by 10 percent comparing with their original 
values. For example, we could increase the depreciation rate of houses by 10 percent, and the other parameter values are 
unchanged. In this situation, the effect of longevity increase on land price is shown in the third bar. 
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Figure D2. Robustness check: Effect of Longevity Increase on House Price 
Notes: From left to right, the first bar in chart is the house price change when parameters are calibrated to their original values. 
Then, we change the parameter values one by one. Each parameter is increased by 10 percent comparing with their original 
values. For example, we could increase the depreciation rate of houses by 10 percent, and the other parameter values are 
unchanged. In this situation, the effect of longevity increase on house price is shown in the third bar. 
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